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INTRODUCTION
This working paper addresses several issues in South African law
relevant to determining whether and to what extent regulations may
address genuine problems in the Copyright Amendment Bill [CAB].
Regulations are of course not yet drafted for this Bill and the Bill remains
a Bill and is not yet an Act. Indeed, as discussed further below, the Bill
is currently under consideration in Parliament as part of a section 79
process. In addition to its focus on the CAB, this paper identifies a set of
emerging South African public law issues associated with similarly
situated legislation.
After a background section that places the CAB within the currently
ongoing joint process between Parliament and President and outlines the
three constitutional reservations to the CAB raised by the President
(section one), this working paper addresses the boundaries on regulations
and the potential role regulations to the CAB can play in three parts:
constitutional issues (section two), new public law issues (section three),
and accepted principles and parameters for drafting regulations in South
Africa (section four).
In section five, more specific questions and issues regarding the CAB
are discussed. These include the question of whether the regulations can
add new definitions of terms (e.g. to the definition of performers to
exclude extras) as well as some specific issues raised with respect to the
bill by informed critics, such as how the bill (particularly section 22(3))
might be read to apply retroactively and the degree to which the royalty
rights in the bill (section 6A, et seq.) and reversion rights may be assigned
through contract. This working paper does not give a view on how to
resolve legitimate problems, but rather outlines options available to
address such problems in regulations – arguing that such options do exist
in regulatory drafting, both in the current period of section 79
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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consideration of the Bill and, assuming the Bill is enacted in at least
roughly similar form, in the period between its enactment and its being
brought into force. Regulations can play a potential significant and
constructive role in both these periods in addressing genuine
constitutional issues.
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE POTENTIAL ENACTMENT OF THE
COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL, 2017

Conducting litigation or engaging in other legal efforts such as the
drafting of regulations may be likened to the production of a film. In such
terms, the movie pitched and analyzed in this working paper is the
drafting of the regulations to the not-yet-enacted CAB (B13B-2017),
which is in front of the President of the Republic of South Africa.
There were at least three movies made prior to the one being pitched
below – one could even term the drafting of regulations a sequel. The
first movie consists of the production of the currently valid law, the
Copyright Act, 98 of 1978. This Act followed those of 1916 and of 1965
(Act 63 of 1965). The 1978 Act has largely been administered by the
Department of Trade and Industry [dti]. 2 Part of its administration
currently falls under the Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission, an agency created in the 2008 Companies Act reform
process (replacing another 1978 piece of legislation, the Companies Act).
For enforcement, a High Court judge currently sits as the Copyright
Tribunal and hears licensing disputes. 3
The second movie consists of the drafting and passage of the CAB,
2017. This production took place from at least 2015 and has been shot
mostly in Parliament, concluding with National Council of Provinces
passage on 29 March 2019. There were plenty of points of drama in this
production.
The third movie – and one that is still playing – is the enactment
process of the CAB. One might of course consider this to be part and
parcel of the drafting and passage of the CAB, but it appears to warrant
separate billing and treatment. In order to be enacted, the CAB needs to
be signed into law by the President in terms of section 79 of the
Constitution. This section provides an opportunity for the President to
surface serious doubts (“reservations”) concerning the constitutionality of
the draft legislation if he has them. The President is empowered through
a procedural veto to send the draft legislation back to Parliament for
reworking by Parliament in line with his concerns.
The President exercised this procedural veto over the CAB in June
2020, writing an 11-page referral letter detailing three constitutional
reservations. 4 As of July, Parliament is now dealing with the President’s
2
3

Copyright Act 98 of 1978 § 1(xxviii) (S. Afr.).
Id. §§ 29-36.

4

Sean Flynn. South African President's Reservations to Copyright Bill Not
Supported
by
Law.
InfoJustice
Blog
(Jul.
13,
2010),
http://infojustice.org/archives/42499
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letter and considering its options. Most political activity is thus
understandably focused on advocating for and against Parliament
modifying or sending the Bill back to the President for his
reconsideration. This joint Parliamentary and Presidential process to
consider the constitutionality of passed but not yet enacted legislation is
one of the structural features of South African constitutional
government. 5
When read closely and properly, the President’s letter sending the Bill
back to Parliament states three reservations: one procedural and two
substantive. The President’s first reservation is a procedural one about
tagging. In paragraph 22.1 of his referral letter of 16 June 2020, the
President wrote: “I am of the view that the Bills have been incorrectly
tagged and that they ought to have been classified and passed as section
76 Bills. This is primarily because their provisions have an impact on
‘Trade’ and ‘Cultural matters’ as contemplated in Schedule 4 of the
Constitution.” Section 75 outlines the ordinary process for passing
national legislation, which was followed for the CAB. The section 76
process is an exception which requires a more substantial role for the
NCOP and the Provinces themselves for legislation that substantially
affects the concurrent regulatory authority of the Provinces granted in the
Constitution. Notably, however, the Provinces do not have any such
authority over intellectual property.
Under the President’s overbroad interpretation any draft legislation
that “impacts” trade or culture must follow section 76. Thus, almost all
bills of any significance would require special handling, and the NCOP’s
carefully crafted constitutional role would be fundamentally changed.
Parliament is not bound by the President’s view of the legislative process.
Albeit in dialogue with the President through s 79, Parliament must work
out for itself how to “tag” its bills and it can stick to its initial decision on
classifying the CAB as a section 75 bill.
Of particular relevance for this working paper, the President’s second
reservation is a substantive one about the regulation of unfair contracts,
overlapping with the issue of retrospectivity. In paragraph 22.2 of his
referral letter of 16 June 2020, the President wrote: “The retrospective
application of the proposed new sections 6A, 7A, and 8A of the Copyright
Bill to copyright assigned before the new sections come into operation
may indeed be unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an
arbitrary deprivation of property under section 25 of the Constitution.”
This reservation is an arguably serious one, yet, as detailed more fully
below, it disregards an easily available interpretation of the CAB in which
the Bill only regulates (1) unfair contracts and does so (2) only going
forward. This working paper argues that to the extent the current Bill
language has any constitutional problem, it can be taken care of in the
regulations to be drafted in the period preceding its coming into effect.

5

Jonathan Klaaren, “Structures of Government in the 1996 South African
Constitution: Putting Democracy Back Into Human Rights,” South African Journal on
Human Rights 13, no. 1 (January 1997): 3–27.
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The President’s third reservation is a substantive one about fair use.
In paragraph 22.3 of his referral letter of 16 June 2020, the President
wrote: “The new exceptions introduced by sections 12A, 12B, 12C, 12D,
and 19B and 19C of the Copyright Bill are also likely to be declared
unconstitutional on the basis that they are in breach of section 25(1) of the
Constitution and the Three-Step test binding South Africa under
international law.”
While not directly relevant to this working paper, this reservation
raises fascinating and far-reaching questions regarding the interaction of
international and constitutional law in South Africa. These widened
copyright exceptions, favouring fair use and enhancing the role of
libraries, are designed to make sure (for example) that contemporary
creatives can quote parts of past works in making their own new ones, and
that textbook publishers cannot price South African students out of the
market. The legal landscape is filled with such examples of reasonable
limitations on private property for the good of the public. As for the
“Three-Step Test”, this international standard has not prevented other
countries from enacting far-reaching copyright exceptions. There is no
reason why this international standard should be applied more
restrictively to South Africa through its own constitution.
II.

DRAFTING REGULATIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL

The Constitutional Significance of Regulations
Once the drama of section 79 consideration is over (and assuming that
an amended Bill in some form is enacted), what might currently be
considered an important sub-plot to the enactment process of the CAB
will emerge as a full-blown storyline in its own right, one with true spinoff potential. While most attention is focused on the joint Presidential
and Parliamentary consideration of the constitutionality of the Bill, work
has already started on a further process that will need to unfold in order
to bring the signed Bill (at that point an Act) into force – the drafting of
regulations for the Copyright Amendment Act.
Even once it is signed by the President, the amendment Act will need
regulations to be drafted so as to be brought into force. This necessity
emerged dramatically in a case the Constitutional Court decided in 2000,
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers. 6 This case is primarily known for
deciding the proposition that a court with the requisite jurisdiction has the
power to review and set aside a decision by the President of South Africa
to bring an Act of Parliament into force in terms of the principle of
legality. Perhaps negotiating the delicate political waters of a litigation
process involving the Presidency, that case was decided on the basis of
assumed error by government lawyers working for the Department of
Health. 7
At a deeper level of detail than the availability of judicial review,
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers also decided a number of threshold issues

6 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) (S. Afr.).
7 Id. at 53-54 para.68.
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regarding the necessity of drafting regulations. Since the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers decision, the South African government – working here
through the Office of the State Attorney and the Office of the State Legal
Advisor – has not been caught since with bringing an Act into force
without the necessary regulations.
The principal constitutional question here is when are regulations
necessary for the implementation of an Act? Regulations would,
presumably, most of the time be helpful to the implementation of
legislation, but when are they necessary? According to the Constitutional
Court, the question it faced was whether “the regulatory base necessary
for the operation of the Act was not in place when [the President published
a proclamation to bring the Act into force] because schedules had not been
made to replace the repealed schedules of the 1965 Act, and other
essential regulations contemplated by the Act had not been made”, 8 ‘[t]he
President’s decision to bring the Act into operation in such circumstances
cannot be found to be objectively rational on any basis whatsoever”. 9 The
Court thus introduced three concepts: the Act’s “regulatory base”,
“essential regulations”, and other subordinate legislation beyond
“essential regulations” – which in this case meant the schedules listing the
drugs to be considered as medicines and those to be available for overthe-counter dispensing. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Court did
not pronounce on the question of the alleged missing essential regulations
and instead decided the case on the basis – ultimately a farther-reaching
basis – of the missing subordinate legislation beyond the regulation, the
schedules.
We should briefly canvass here two further constitutional matters that
may extend the running time of the enactment movie. First, as an
authoritative and publicly available senior counsel opinion on the CAB,
the Cowen et al. Opinion (para. 53 note 49), notes: once the CAB is
signed by the President and becomes an Act of Parliament, it is open to
constitutional challenge in the ordinary course even before it comes into
force, if a right has been infringed. 10 A further point to articulate here is
that the regulation drafting process may occur simultaneously with
constitutional challenges to the legislation. The precedent for such a
constitutional challenge occurred in a public welfare context (the potential
legislation exclusion of permanent residents from the extension of South
Africa’s social security net). 11 A challenge to legislation before it comes
into force and while regulations are being drafted would likely
demonstrate the required standing and secure at least a hearing in court.
In this scenario, the challenge to the Act would most likely be raised by
interests sufficiently aggrieved by the legislation and desirous of an
outcome whereby the legislation is struck down, changed, or delayed or

8

Id. at 5-6 para. 5.
Id. at 68 para 89.
10 See Susannah Cowen et al., Legal Opinion of Advocate Cowan (2019), https://www.recreateza.org/legal-opinion-on-the-bill.
11 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v
Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at 55-58 paras. 90-92 (S. Afr.); see also
Max Du Plessis, Glenn Penfold, and Jason Brickhill, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (Juta 2013).
9
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even where the process of drafting regulations is either delayed, disrupted,
or influenced by the simultaneous ongoing constitutional challenge to the
empowering legislation.
Another gateway to constitutional challenge that might extend the
running time of the enactment movie is found in another section of the
Constitution. This section provides a limited supplementary or additional
legislative role to a minority of the members of the first house of
Parliament. In terms of section 80, one-third of the members of the
National Assembly may approach the Constitutional Court directly in
respect of the constitutionality of an Act before it is brought into force.
This route to a constitutional challenge to legislation has never been
exercised since 1994. One might imagine a scenario where agreement in
Parliament to such an exercise would be a “quid pro quo” for Presidential
signature. In this case, the simultaneous process of drafting regulations
might well be voluntarily paused, modified or delayed by government.
New Public Law Issues
With the above distinction of the sequel from its three related but
earlier productions made in Section I and the constitutional issues
explored in Section II, we turn now to the main show of this working
paper – drafting regulations for the CAB. Apart from the audiences built
up by the earlier movies, why should cinema-goers care to look at the
CAB from the point of view of drafting regulations? Apart from the
constitutional arguments in Section II, there are two reasons, one
generally accepted and non-controversial and the second also significant
but much less recognized.
First, as is the case with most but not all legislation, the CAB must be
accompanied by subordinate legislation (including here regulations) in
order to be successfully implemented. The necessity of subordinate
legislation for the implementation of Parliamentary Acts has been a
constant feature of the South African polity since the first decades of the
20th century. The necessity of such delegated public power was affirmed
first in the post-apartheid era in the case of Executive Council of the
Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South
Africa and Others. 12 Regulations are recognized as crucial for legislation.
In one notable recent instance, draft regulations to the Carbon Tax Bill
were drafted and made public while consideration of the Carbon Tax Bill
was ongoing.
In post-apartheid South Africa, the process of drafting regulations for
implementation of an Act has often been fairly lengthy. While there is
apparently no comprehensive study available to provide a precise figure,
the process of drafting regulations appears to take at least 6-12 months.
A 2016 study of the Office of the State Legal Advisor shows that most of
the drafting of legislation and regulations is done within line departments
rather than undertaken in the specialist units of state lawyers. This
governmental lawyering unit did however report a 85% compliance rate
in turning around within 40 days certifications of legislative instruments

12

1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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drafted elsewhere and submitted to the Office. 13 The practice with
legislative instruments administered by the dti seems to be for in-house
drafting of subordinate legislation. 14
At this point, a new and directly relevant sub-plot emerges to our
movie – the implementation of the CAB (once in force) through the
drafting of regulations. This new sub-plot relates to an earlier piece of
dti- drafted and dti-administered piece of legislation, the Intellectual
Property Law Amendment Act (Act. No. 28 of 2013) (IPLAA). IPLAA
introduces amendments that make traditional works (which include
indigenous works) subject to copyright protection. As is apparent from
its title, this legislation has been enacted. However, it has not yet been
brought into effect. The apparent reason that this Act from seven years
ago has not been brought into effect is that its regulations have not yet
been drafted. 15 As currently drafted, IPLAA contains a reference to the
Copyright Act. Regarding this specific issue of the IPLAA, Cabinet
currently understands that another piece of draft legislation, the
Indigenous Knowledge Systems Bill, will remove the reference in the
IPLAA to the Copyright Act.
Again, here the dti is not necessarily out of line with relatively
common South African government practice as a number of amendment
bills across the state have become stuck in this stage and have never been
brought into effect. The Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008,
administered by the Department of Home Affairs and brought into effect
on 1 January 2020, twelve years after enactment, are a case in point. 16
Second, a less-usual function for subordinate legislation –
interpretation interacting with the ongoing formulation and interpretation
of the primary legislation -- is highlighted by the fact that the CAB has
been considered by the Presidency to have serious concerns regarding its
constitutionality and thus sent back to Parliament. The President is in part
concerned that a plausible interpretation of the legislation would result in
its unconstitutionality. This concern would obviously need to be
grounded in a specific substantive or procedural constitutional challenge.
While arguable, and apparently not yet decided in the Constitutional
Court, a concern of this sort arguably rises to the level of a serious and
genuine doubt regarding constitutionality on the part of the President in
terms of section 79. It is a feature of the South African constitutional
design that drafting of regulations may occur simultaneously with this
process – this is why these legal issues may well be termed “new” public
law issues.
A tangential but nonetheless related situation occurs in the remedial
phase of constitutional adjudication.
Due to the post-apartheid
reconfiguration of the distribution of judicial and legislative control over
13

Jonathan Klaaren, Civil Government Lawyers in South Africa, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 365–77
(2016).
14 There is scope here to research and draft a table on this issue.
15 See Susannah Cowen, Jonathan Berger, and Mehluli Nxumalo, Opinion on CAB and the
Constitution (2019), http://libguides.wits.ac.za/Copyright_and_Related_Issues/Opinion at para
23.
16 It may be worth further research to canvass the department’s IP Acts as a whole.
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statutes, there have been occasions for South African courts to consider
draft legislation. For instance, in a recent Constitutional Court argument
regarding a SARS customs and search case, advocates used a draft
amendment act in arguing the remedy already tabled. 17 The Court
referred approvingly to this use in its reasoning.
What is highlighted by the above episode in the third movie is the
element of continuity (really here, dynamic interaction) between that
interpretive exercise (of the CAB) and the drafting of regulations. In
effect, it appears as if the CAB has been sent back for further legislative
clarification (i.e. amendment) on some controversial parts in order to
avoid unconstitutional interpretations. This could be termed a “clarify
and avoid” legal strategy as part of the section 79 consideration process.
An earlier instance of this apparently occurred with the Protection of
State Information Bill (B6 of 2010). Ignoring major other issues of
potential unconstitutionality, this Bill was first sent back by the
Presidency under Jacob Zuma in 2013 on the basis that some relatively
minor parts of the Bill were irrational and made in error and made no
sense. Arguably, there was an interpretation available to the Presidency
and to Parliament that the version in fact could be interpreted in
conformity with the Constitution on this point. But the Parliament instead
amended the draft legislation, correcting these errors, and sent it back to
the Presidency (where it still remains). While there are other plausible
interpretations of this episode of constitutional politics at least one is the
one sketched out above. Indeed, the Presidency now appears to wish to
essentially disregard this earlier referral and, in what it admits is an
unprecedented situation, has in June 2020 referred the Protection of State
Information Bill to Parliament a second time, but this time with serious
reservations.
On this theory, if all of some of the outstanding legitimate complaints
about the CAB (either complaints of policy or of legislative interpretation
running afoul of the Constitution) can be addressed by draft regulations,
then this demonstration of and commitment to a specific interpretation of
the Bill may give the President the space he needs to sign the Bill and
allow the regulation process to move forward. Within the bounds of the
Constitution, promises can be made to “fix problems” in the regulations
or commitments undertaken to (or tactics embarked upon) to delay hard
questions to the regulations. Without question, this argument may in
some instances be taken too far. For instance, a survey of existing
Copyright Act subordinate legislation and necessary changes and addition
prompted by the CAB might theoretically provide an argument relevant
to the tagging argument in the third movie (enactment). 18 This may be a
step too far for South African legal culture. There is much more to say
here but that is another production.

17
18

Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others 2014 (1) SA 442 (CC) (S. Afr.).
Cowen et al., supra note 8, at paras. 83.1 and 87.
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Accepted Principles and Parameters for Statutory Interpretation
and Regulatory Drafting
As most legal practitioners and scholars realize, regulations
implement principal legislation and often become just as if not more
significant to persons, firms, and industries working with the primary
legislation. Regulations can structure further levels of implementation
including guidance documents. One example might be a “Guide to Best
Practices in Fair Use” for certain sectors of the creative industries. Such
guidance documents may be drafted on private or government initiative. 19
There exists to some extent a current debate in South African
administrative law over whether or not interpretations of primary
legislation relied upon by implementing bureaucrats and relatively
longstanding may be given any interpretative weight due to that fact.20
There is no South African doctrine parallel to the American Chevron
interpretation. In part due to these features and to their potential impact,
regulatory drafting process can be just as contested as the legislative
drafting process and perhaps more so.
The Chevron question has, however, recently appeared in the
Constitutional Court. In Marshall (see note 19) , with the pleadings
closed, the Chief Justice issued directions dated 22 November 2017, inter
alia, inviting the parties within defined timelines to file written
submissions on: “the extent to which a court may consider or defer to an
administrative body’s interpretation of legislation, such as [the
Interpretation Note] and whether [the SCA’s] approach was in accordance
with this”. As confirmed in CSAR v Bosch, South African practice had
been to use such documents if uncontested as tipping pieces of evidence
in marginal cases of statutory interpretation. 21 This practice began with
the pro-plaintiff decision of R v Detody, which confirmed the nonapplication of segregationist pass laws to women in 1926. 22 Strikingly,
a unanimous Constitutional Court reconsidered and nearly overturned this
theme of statutory interpretation, even in the face of its consistency with
Endumeni. 23 The reasoning of the Court in Marshall was such:
[9] The rule thus originated in the context of legislative
supremacy where statutory interpretation was aimed at
ascertaining the intention of the legislature. In that particular
context custom could “tip the balance” in cases of ambiguous
legislation. Bosch recognised that the rule had to be adapted to
contextual statutory interpretation. The rationale for relying on
19 AAA Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and Another
2007 (1) SA 343 (CC) (S. Afr.) (regulations drafted by a private body considered as PAJA
administrative action).
20 See inter alia Allison Anthony, Administrative Justice Association of South Africa
(AdjASA) Conference 2019: Administrative Justice in and Beyond the Courts (Mar. 5-6, 2019);
see also Marshall and Others v Commission for the South Africa Revenue Service 2019 (6) SA
246 (CC) (S. Afr.).

21

Bosch and Another v Commissioner of South African Revenue Services (A
94/2012) [2012] ZAWCHC 188; [2013] 2 All SA 41 (WCC); 2013 (5) SA 130 (WCC)
(20 November 2012).
22
23

Rex v Detody 1926 AD 198.
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) (S.

Afr.).
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consistent interpretation by those responsible for the
administration of legislation also changed from “custom” to the
assistance that could be gained from their evidence in determining
“the meaning that should reasonably be placed upon those words”.
[10] Missing from this reformulation is any explicit mention of a
further fundamental contextual change, that from legislative
supremacy to constitutional democracy. Why should a unilateral
practice of one part of the executive arm of government play a role
in the determination of the reasonable meaning to be given to a
statutory provision? It might conceivably be justified where the
practice is evidence of an impartial application of a custom
recognised by all concerned, but not where the practice is
unilaterally established by one of the litigating parties. In those
circumstances it is difficult to see what advantage evidence of the
unilateral practice will have for the objective and independent
interpretation by the courts of the meaning of legislation, in
accordance with constitutionally compliant precepts. It is best
avoided.” 24
This section covers two major topics: the current South African law
on legal interpretation (including statutory interpretation) and the current
South African law on regulatory drafting.
To begin with the first, as has become clear, the 2012 case of
Endumeni Municipality fundamentally changed and replaced the preexisting paradigm of legal interpretation in South Africa. Interpretation
may be defined as ‘process of attributing meaning to the words used in a
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or
contract’.25 Endumeni effected its revolution by challenging as a fiction
the concept underlying the pre-existing approach, the notion of a
discoverable and coherent intention of the legislature (or other drafting
institution) that passed the statute (or other legal instrument). As Wallis
J wrote: ‘[T]here is no such thing as the intention of the legislature in
relation to the meaning of specific provisions in a statute, particularly as
they may fall to be interpreted in circumstances that were not present to
the minds of those involved in their preparation. Accordingly to
characterise the task of interpretation as a search for such an ephemeral
and possibly chimerical meaning is unrealistic and misleading.’26
The previous approach could be found in the 1995 case of Coopers &
Lybrand v Bryant, decided by the Appellate Division under the interim
Constitution.27 Here, the proper approach to interpretation was
summarised as being that one should first "ascertain the literal meaning
of the words" and thereafter have regard to context and background
circumstances, applying extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances

24

Marshall and Others v Commission for the South Africa Revenue Service 2019 (6) SA 246
(CC) at 5-6 paras. 9-10 (S. Afr.).
25 Supra note 20, at para. 18.
26 Id. at para. 21.
27 1995 (3) SA 761 (AD).
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when encountering ambiguity.28 Decided 17 years after Coopers &
Lybrand, Endumeni Municipality may be understood as the culmination
of a gradual shift away from a literal process of interpreting contracts and
statutes to one where both text and context have a role to play.
There is little doubt that Endumeni Municipality has now become the
dominant text in South African legal interpretation.
A recent
Constitutional Court judgement, ACSA v Big Five, confirms and
exemplifies the trendline of the past 8 years. There the Court noted that
in the litigation before it, “[t]here is no dispute about the principles of
interpretation. The correct approach to the interpretation of documents
was summarised by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Endumeni
Municipality:
“Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words
used in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory
instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by
reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its
coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document,
consideration must be given to the language used in the light of
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the
provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and
the material known to those responsible for its production. Where
more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be
weighed in the light of all these factors. The process is objective,
not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that
leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the
apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and
guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as
reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually
used. To do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to
cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a
contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other
than the one they in fact made. The ‘inevitable point of departure
is the language of the provision itself’, read in context and having
regard to the purpose of the provision and the background to the
preparation and production of the document.”
In a legal academic article published in the Pochefstroom Electronic
Law Journal, the authoring judge of Endumeni Municipality, Malcolm
Wallis, a judge on the Supreme Court of Appeal, has written on the topic
of ‘Interpretation Before and After National Joint Municipal Pension
Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA).’ 29 Wallis makes
several points relevant to the content, spirit, and application of the new
Endumeni legal interpretation paradigm. First, consistent with the gradual
shift away from a literal interpretation, Wallis notes that both text and
28

Id at 768 A-E.
Malcolm Wallis, Interpretation Before and After Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v
Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA), POCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC LAW JOURNAL (2019).
29
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context have a role to play, and which will predominate will depend on
the circumstances of each case. 30 Second, he notes two of the principles
underlying Endumeni. 31 First, Endumeni demands of judges that they
articulate their reasons, both linguistic and contextual, for arriving at their
decisions on questions of the construction of documents. Second, it is
desirable to have a single reasonably clear standard for the interpretation
of documents that enables lawyers and courts to go about their business
of interpreting documents, without becoming bogged down in the "how"
of interpretation. Third, Wallis observes that “[s]tatutes directed at
ameliorating a distinct social problem are entitled to a more generous
construction, given that purpose, than a technical regulatory statute such
as the Companies Act.” 32 Fourth, Wallis observes that Endumeni by no
means represents a rolling back of the movement towards allowing
reference to parliamentary drafting materials in the interpretation of
statutes. “Legislative history is another source of relevant context that
can be of great assistance in resolving problems of interpretation and can
on occasions prove decisive in clarifying what is otherwise obscure.” 33
As he notes, “[t]he explanatory memorandum prepared by the committee
that drafted the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 has been referred to on
countless occasions as providing relevant context to the provisions of the
LRA.” 34 Wallis is here drawing on a context of English and South
African law. The rule against the admissibility of parliamentary materials
has (controversially) been abolished in England. 35
The above observations may imply several propositions particularly
relevant to the interpretation of the amended Copyright Act. First, the
third observation made by Wallis implies that we should make a
distinction between two of the principal purposes of the amended Act: the
“feed the starving artists” purpose (e.g. redistribution within the creative
industries) and the purpose to introduce fair use within the copyright
regulatory regime (more technical). A more generous construction may
be attributed to provisions reflective of the first purpose. Second, the
fourth observation made by Wallis confirms that an explanatory
memorandum to accompany the regulation drafting process may be
worthwhile. Further, it indicates that existing parliamentary materials
(such as the explanatory memorandum for the Copyright Amendment
Act) are worth engaging with at level of statutory interpretation as well as
at level of regulatory drafting. Fifth, Wallis observes that as important
element of interpretation is to consider the statute as a whole. Here, “the
provisions of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 operate as interpretative
guides in certain situations, and section 39(2) of the Constitution contains
the injunction that legislation must be interpreted in accordance with the
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spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” 36 Sixth, although South
Africa is not a party to the Vienna Convention, section 233 of the
Constitution requires courts where possible to construe all law in
accordance with international law. 37 Seventh, Wallis makes a final
observation about the place of social content and particularly commercial
context in legal interpretation. Here, Wallis appears to be distancing
himself from a call for interpretation in line with commercial sensibility.
He is careful to state “… commercial sensibility … is an expression to be
found in the English judgments, which focus particularly on commercial
contracts. It is not an expression used in Endumeni. What I said was that
a sensible construction was to be preferred to one that was insensible or
unbusinesslike. And provided judges heed the warning that followed, that
it is not for them to impose their personal sense of what would be sensible
or desirable in place of what the parties to the contract or the legislative
body have actually said, this should not be problematic. …. When one
speaks of a contract being unbusinesslike, the danger of course lies in
failing to resist the temptation to rescue one party from the consequences
of a bad bargain, but I would have thought that it was clear that this is not
the judicial role.” 38
To move to the second topic of this section, the legal doctrines
relevant to drafting regulations in South Africa are nearly all derived from
instances of judicial review. And many do not originate in cases of
regulations but instead derive from judicial review of exercises of
discretion. Perhaps the primary example is the case of Dawood. In that
early Constitutional Court case, the court held that legislatures cannot
grant unfettered discretion to administrator and must provide at least some
minimal guidelines. This constitutional holding aligns well with the usual
practice of statutory interpretation in judicial review holding that a
legislature (e.g. Parliament) may frame an administrative power given in
a statute widely or narrowly. This is referred to as a wide or a narrow
discretion – e.g. the breadth of the discretion allowed to the administrator
to exercise. Statutes with narrow discretions are often detailed and
technical, providing sufficient statutory textual fodder for reviewing
courts to ascertain a standard against which to measure administrative
action. [It may be worth reviewing the cases interpreting the Copyright
Act to date; presumably they mostly concern exercises of discretion.]
Despite the lack of decided cases specifically considering the drafting
of regulations, it effectively certain that regulatory interpretation will
follow Endumeni. In a case decided around the same time as Endumeni,
the Constitutional Court reversed another decision of the Supreme Court
of Appeal, attempting to find and articulate the same balance between text
and context that Wallis has articulated in Endumeni: “… Although a
number of factors need to be considered in this kind of enquiry, the central
element is to link the question of compliance to the purpose of the
provision. In this Court, O’Regan J succinctly put the question in ACDP
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v Electoral Commission as being “whether what the applicant did
constituted compliance with the statutory provisions viewed in the light
of their purpose”. This is not the same as asking whether compliance with
the provisions will lead to a different result.” 39
As background, the making of regulations (e.g. the unified process of
their drafting and their promulgation) is best considered as satisfying the
definition of administrative action in terms of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act and thus needs to satisfy the legal
requirements incorporated in that legislation – which itself largely
implements the content of section 33 in the Constitution, the right of just
administrative action. Even if the making of regulations were not to be
considered administrative action, the doctrines below would most likely
apply as a matter of the principle of legality. 40 There is no recognized
general South African law requiring regulations to undergo a process of
notice and comment – instead, there may be specific participation
processes specified in the primary legislation. Further, a process akin to
notice and comment is a discretionary option that may be undertaken by
the drafter of the regulations in terms of PAJA section 4.
Given the above understanding, we can formulate, as a working
framework, five legal doctrines that both empower and constrain drafting
regulations for the amended Copyright Act. First, regulations must be
intra vires their empowering legislation or other empowering legal
instrument. 41 In elaborating upon this doctrine, one rule of construction
is that the words of a regulation made under powers derived from a statute
cannot be relied upon as an aid to the construction of the statute itself.
Second, regulations, like other laws, must be written in a clear and
accessible manner. 42 According to the Constitutional Court, “[t]he
doctrine of vagueness is founded on the rule of law, which … is a
foundational value of our constitutional democracy. It requires that laws
must be written in a clear and accessible manner. What is required is
reasonable certainty and not perfect lucidity. The doctrine of vagueness
does not require absolute certainty of laws. The law must indicate with
reasonable certainty to those who are bound by it what is required of them
so that they may regulate their conduct accordingly. The doctrine of
vagueness must recognise the role of government to further legitimate
social and economic objectives. And should not be used unduly to impede
or prevent the furtherance of such objectives.” (footnotes omitted).
Third, regulations must not be based on errors of law. 43
39
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41 See University of Cape Town v Minister of Education & Culture 1988 (3) SA 203 (CC);
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recommendation from the Private Industry Security Regulatory
Authority, the Minister of Police amended regulations with the effect that
firms in the security industry would need to pay some security guards
more. 44 These firms objected. The threshold issue of administrative
action was determined to be clear. 45 While the Authority had complied
with the participation process in the empowering legislation, the firms
objected that the consultation was mechanical. 46 More significantly, they
also claimed that the Authority was materially influenced by an error of
law in understanding regulations could not differentiate between large and
small firms. 47 The reviewing court agreed with the firms. The legal
interpretive error was that the regulations could differentiate – see Act
section 35(2): “Different regulations may be made in terms of subsection
(1) with reference to different categories or classes of security service
providers.” The evidence of the view of the Authority was in Authority’s
“analysis of comments”. 48 The statutory interpretation exercise shows
“contrary to the view conveyed to the Minister by the Authority that
current legislation did not permit it to classify businesses by size or
income in order to arrive a differentiated fees, it was so permitted.” 49
Fourth, regulations must be rational. The controlling test in this area
of SA administrative law may be stated as: “is there a rational objective
basis justifying the connection made by the administrative decisionmaker between the material properly available to him and the conclusion
he or she eventually arrived at.” 50 In renewing a station community
broadcasting license but refusing to extend its area beyond legacy Ciskei
and Transkei to the city of Port Elizabeth, it was rational for the
telecommunications regulator to consider the then-current absence of
broadcasting policy and to wish to maintain a level playing field in areas
such as Port Elizabeth. However, it was not rational for the regulator to
impose license condition of 20% iXhosa and 20% Afrikaans language
content quotas in total when the only information supporting this was
applicant’s undertaking to provide 20% iXhosa and 20% Afrikaans of the
local content (which was 25% of the total content).
Fifth, regulations must be proportionate and reasonable. 51 In this
case, regulations presumptively prohibiting use of off-road vehicles on
beaches were challenged but found not to be unreasonable because of
various and wide-ranging automatic exemptions.
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III.

ISSUES FOR REGULATIONS ON THE CAB

In order to produce and draft the regulations for the CAB, we need to
consult with and to some extent consolidate four sets of texts and
doctrines (four scripts). These are first (and most significant) the text of
the Copyright Act, as amended by the CAB. This text has not yet been
produced or finalized but can, for current purposes, be read from the texts
of the current Act and the Bill. This set of texts also includes other
parliamentary materials, such as the explanatory memorandum to the Bill.
The second set of texts and doctrines is the case of Endumeni and related
cases, which enunciates a new South African paradigm of statutory
interpretation (this has been covered above in section four). The third is
a set of cases and doctrines (mostly consisting of instances of judicial
review) that provide some clear parameters for South Africa regulatory
drafting (this has been covered above in section four). The fourth set is
the set of the Copyright Regulations and any other current subordinate
legislation to the Copyright Act. These regulations and notices are the
hard sub-statutory law that the regulations to be drafted will supplement,
replace and incorporate or change, or repeal.
Issues for Regulatory Clarification
In relation to the Copyright Act (as amended), the first question is to
identify which provisions of the amended Act need regulations either in
order to have effective implementation or to clarify and avoid
controversial substantive constitutional questions. Here, there are four
primary provisions which are controversial. In each of these four areas in
different ways, draft regulations can potentially alleviate constitutional
concerns.
First, the creator royalty sharing provisions (sections 5A-9A) are
claimed to violate the right to property. As explored further below, the
role that draft regulations may play here is both to clarify and avoid a
plausible interpretation of the amended Act that would be unconstitutional
(as explored below) and to supplement the amended Act: creating a
constitutionally-compliant institution to resolve disputes between creators
and rights-holders regarding these royalties. Second, the fair use
provisions (section 12A) are claimed to violate the right to property. The
role that draft regulations may play here is to clarify that that the
implementation and operation of fair use is constitutionally compliant.
Third, the creator reversion provisions (section 22) are claimed to violate
the right to property. In relation to these provisions, the draft regulations
can also clarify and avoid a plausible interpretation of the amended Act
that would be unconstitutional (as explored below). Finally, the amended
Act has a significant different enforcement mechanism from the original
1978 Act, featuring an expanded role of the Copyright Tribunal (section
29). Here, draft regulations can update and extend the existing regulations
allowing the Tribunal to operate. While this is not an area of direct
constitutional concern, an oft-stated concern with the amended Act as a
whole is that it attempts to strike a balance between creator and rightsholders interests but does not have the tools to finely assess or calibrate
that balance in cases where either creators or rights-holders are refusing
to cooperate in the process of negotiation.
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Existing Regulations
We can turn briefly now to the existing regulations to the Copyright
Act. Unfortunately, there is no South African government documentation
that consolidates into one text all currently existing regulations for an Act.
The original set of regulations to the Copyright Act is contained in
Government Notice no. R2530 in Government Gazette no. 6252 of 22
December 1978 (in operation since 1 January 1979) (the 1979
regulations). These have been supplemented by several further pieces of
regulations. The 1979 regulations are organized into five chapters.
Chapter 1 covers reproduction regulations. These regulations will need
to be revised in light of the fair use provisions of the amended Act.
Chapter 2 covers sound recording royalties. This chapter may serve as a
starting point for the extension of royalties to creators in other sectors
beyond music and sound recording. Chapter 3 covers authors of
cinematograph films. Chapter 4 provides the Copyright Tribunal
Regulations. This chapter will require revision in light of the extensive
changes to the Tribunal in the amended Act. Chapter 5 covers some
miscellaneous topics.
While it is not a necessary golden thread that needs to be woven
between a regulation drafting initiative and a legal opinion on the
constitutionality of the CAB, this working paper adopts for purposes of
consistency the statutory interpretation of the purposes of the Copyright
Act Bill (which is of course distinct from the analysis of the amended Act)
from Cowen et al. (Opinion para 27). These are: (1) to modernize South
African copyright law and update the 1978 Act, including to bring our
legislation in line with the needs of the fast-evolving digital age; (2) to
bring South African law in line with international standards and to
implement the content of international treaties relating to copyright (both
those to which South Africa is already a party and those it intends to
accede to); (3) to promote socio-economic development and poverty
reduction, innovation and a knowledge economy in the interests of all
South Africans; (4) to balance the need to incentivize creativity and
knowledge development with the need to facilitate access to works in the
public interest; (5) to protect and advance the interests of authors and
creators; (6) to promote the rights of others including the right of access
to education and the right to equality especially to protect the rights of
persons with disabilities. The fifth and the sixth of these purposes would
seem at first blush to fall within the category identified by Wallis as ones
to be applied generously.
Continuing the theme of a golden thread, it may be worth making a
comment on the element of continuity. For instance, as discussed in the
Cowen et al. Opinion (paras. 137-138), a constitutional concern has been
expressed that the CAB impermissibly delegates powers to the Minister
of Trade and Industry to make regulations in respect of sections 6A(7)(b),
7A(7)(b), and8A(5)(b). This is countered by Cowen et al. (paras. 139145). There is some doctrinal and interpretative overlap here with the
regulatory making power. The SA doctrine of appellate estoppel that
enforces this sort of consistency was expressed in Municipal Employees
Pension Fund v Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Superannuation)
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and Others (April 8, 2017) (Constitutional Court).
The date on which the President signs the CAB into law as an
amendment to the Copyright Act is different from the date on which the
amendments themselves will come into force. As noted in Cowen at al.
Opinion, page 25, at note 49, in terms of section 38(1) the CAB comes
into force on a date to be fixed by the President by proclamation in the
Gazette. The amendments may be brought into force on diverse dates, as
is common practice in South Africa. As is also common practice, there is
no statutory provision for a specific date or process for the general CAB
regulations to come into force.
In the CAB, there are two different processes legislated for drafting
regulations depending on the subject matter of the regulations. This may
contribute to different regulations coming into effect on different dates.
The general process for regulations is specified and governed by section
38(1) for the regulations required to put the CAB amendments into force.
In terms of this general process for regulations, the CAB (clause 33
amending section 39 of the Act) requires that “[b]efore making any
regulations in terms of subsection (1), the Minister must publish the
proposed regulations for public comment for a period of not less than 30
days.” The CAB is adding this procedural requirement as the Copyright
Act currently has no general 30-day public comment requirement.
Further, there is no requirement for different regulations to be brought
into effect at the same time.
A supplemental set of additional requirements to the regulation
drafting process is identified in clauses 5 (inserting section 6A(7)), 7
(inserting section 7A(7)) and 9 (inserting section 8A(5)) of the CAB
regarding the creator royalty regulations. At issue in these sections is the
right of the author of a copyrighted work to share in royalties in respect
of literacy or musical works, visual artistic works, and audio-visual
works. For regulations dealing with this subject matter, the drafting will
be in two parts. First, the Minister must develop (a) draft regulations
setting out the process to give effect to the application of each section to
eligible works; (b) conduct an impact assessment of the proposed process;
and (c) table the draft regulations and impact assessment in the National
Assembly (one of the houses of Parliament). Second, once this first
process is complete, the Minister may then make these regulations
through the Act’s usual section 39 regulation process. There is
considerable scope here for interpretation, as well as for considering the
interaction of this process with the PAJA. The creator royalty regulations
are thus subject to two instances of public comment and should be
specifically considered for approval by the National Assembly.
The usual practice for statutory definition of regulation-making
powers in South Africa is to list specific matters for which regulations can
be made (sometimes with specific consultation requirements such as with
the Minister of Finance), as well as to enact a non-specific regulationmaking power (e.g. “The Minister may make regulations as to any matter
required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed by regulations.”) as well
as often a general incidental regulation-making power (e.g. “The Minister
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may make regulations generally, as to any matter which he considers it
necessary or expedient to prescribe in order that the purposes of this Act
may be achieved.”). The Copyright Act currently adopts this structure
and the amendments of the CAB work within that structure.
In its clause 33, the CAB adds specific regulation-making powers in
five areas, amending section 39 of the Act. The first area is strengthening
the Tribunal: “(cF) prescribing rules regulating the processes and
proceedings of the Tribunal.” The second area includes regulations
covering both the controversial areas of creator royalty rights and
reversion rights: “(cG) prescribing compulsory and standard contractual
terms to be included in agreements to be entered in terms of this Act.”
The third area is one not discussed in this working paper, technological
protection measures: “(cH) prescribing permitted acts for circumvention
of technological protection measures contemplated in section 28B after
due consideration of the following factors.” These regulations may only
be made “after due consideration of the following factors: (i) The
availability for use of works protected by copyright; (ii) the availability
for use of works for non-profit archival and educational purposes;
(iii) the impact of the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
protection measures applied to works or protected by copyright on
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research; or
(iv) the effect of the circumvention of technological protection measures
on the market for or value of works protected by copyright.” The fourth
area is royalty rates: “(cI) prescribing royalty rates or tariffs for various
forms of use.” The fifth area is also not one discussed in this working
paper, regulating the distribution and collection processes of the
collecting societies: “(cJ) prescribing the percentage and period within
which distribution of royalties must be made by collecting societies” and
“(cK) prescribing the terms and manner relating to the management of
unclaimed royalties, code of conduct and any other matter relating to the
reporting, operations, activities and better collection processes of
royalties by a collecting society.”
We focus here on the overlapping second and fourth areas of
competence for drafting regulations. These regulations include within
their subject matter two key innovations of the CAB: both the
controversial additional creator royalty rights in the CAB (amended
section 6 (literary or musical works), section 7 (visual artistic works),
section 8 (audiovisual works), and section 9 (sound recordings)) and the
controversial reversion right in the CAB (clause 23 amending section
22(3) of the Act). The Cowen et al. Opinion did not consider the new
section 22(3) reversion right nor is s 22(3) strictly speaking part of the
President’s reservations but s 22(3) was mentioned in passing in the
President’s referral letter.
The insertion of new sections 6A, 7A and 8A into the Act will mean
that authors of literary, musical or visual works have an inalienable right
to a fair royalty on the exploitation of their work. These sections operate
both in respect of works where the right to royalties has already been
assigned and in respect of works where the right to royalties has yet to be
assigned. In respect of the first category of works, the insertion of the
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sections does have an impact on past transactions in that they impose new
terms and obligations on the parties to any contract dealing with the
assignment of royalties. 52
There are arguably two readings for the new sections 6A, 7A, and 8A.
In one reading, these sections apply only to works with unfair royalties.
This is an interpretation without constitutional concerns. In a second
reading, the new sections can be read to apply to all works. This is an
interpretation arguably with constitutional concerns, regarding the
arbitrary deprivation of the right to property.
There are two readings of the new section 22(3). In one reading, it
can be read as prospective only. This is an interpretation without
constitutional concerns.
In a second reading, it can be read
retrospectively. This is an interpretation arguably with constitutional
concerns, regarding the arbitrary deprivation of the right to property.
There are at least three potential routes drawing upon the regulatory
drafting function to alleviate the arguable constitutional concern. One
route is to explicitly adopt the prospective interpretation of section 22(3)
in the regulations. This would directly address any plausible issue of
unconstitutionality and is perhaps the best option. A second route is to
use the regulations to limit the category of holders of the reversion right.
For instance, extras in audiovisual works could be defined not to be
holders of the reversion right in section 22(3). A third route would be to
specify for enforcement a non-intrusive form of the reversion right. For
instance, extras holding a reversion right might be limited to satisfaction
of that right only through compensation, eliminating the potential for a
provision that might holdup the production of the audiovisual work.
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